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000827276 019__ $$a1030482142$$a1030609972$$a1030764569$$a1030815376
000827276 020__ $$a9783319769509$$q(electronic book)
000827276 020__ $$a3319769502$$q(electronic book)
000827276 020__ $$z9783319769493
000827276 020__ $$z3319769499
000827276 035__ $$aSP(OCoLC)on1030303383
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000827276 049__ $$aISEA
000827276 050_4 $$aBJ1521
000827276 08204 $$a179/.9$$223
000827276 1001_ $$aKershnar, Stephen,$$eauthor.
000827276 24510 $$aTotal collapse :$$bthe case against responsibility and morality /$$cStephen Kershnar.
000827276 264_1 $$aCham, Switzerland :$$bSpringer,$$c[2018].
000827276 264_4 $$c©2018
000827276 300__ $$a1 online resource.
000827276 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
000827276 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
000827276 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
000827276 504__ $$aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
000827276 5050_ $$a1 Introduction -- Part I; No Non-Consequentialist Morality -- 2 How Consent Works -- 3 Problems with Forfeiture -- 4 Against Proportionality: Proportionality is Not a Side-Constraint on Punishment -- 5 Rights Fail and Why This Explains the Other Failures -- Part II; Why There is no non-consequentialist morality -- 6 No responsibility (Responsibility and Foundationalism) -- 7 If There Were Responsibility, It Wouldn't Do Much Work (Responsibility and Internalism) -- 8 No Responsibility No Morality -- 9 Responsibility Revisionists and Skeptics -- 10 Appendix One: What is Moral Responsibility? -- 11 Appendix Two: God is Not Morally Responsible. 
000827276 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
000827276 520__ $$aThis book argues that there is no morality and that people are not morally responsible for what they do. In particular, it argues that what people do is neither right nor wrong and that they are neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy for doing it. Morality and moral responsibility lie at the heart of how we view the world. In our daily life, we feel that people act rightly or wrongly, make the world better or worse, and are virtuous or vicious. These policies are central to our justifying how we see the world and treat others. In this book, the author argues that our views on these matters are false. He presents a series of arguments that threaten to undermine our theoretical and practical worldviews. The philosophical costs of denying moral responsibility and morality are enormous. It does violence to philosophical positions that many people took a lifetime to develop. Worse, it does violence to our everyday view of people. A host of concepts that we rely on daily (praiseworthy, blameworthy, desert, virtue, right, wrong, good, bad, etc.) fail to refer to any property in the world and are thus deeply mistaken. This book is of interest to philosophers, lawyers, and humanities professors as well as people interested in morality, law, religion, and public policy.
000827276 588__ $$aVendor-supplied metadata.
000827276 650_0 $$aVirtue.
000827276 650_0 $$aResponsibility.
000827276 77608 $$iPrint version: $$z3319769499$$z9783319769493$$w(OCoLC)1022077571
000827276 852__ $$bebk
000827276 85640 $$3SpringerLink$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-76950-9$$zOnline Access$$91397441.1
000827276 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:827276$$pGLOBAL_SET
000827276 980__ $$aEBOOK
000827276 980__ $$aBIB
000827276 982__ $$aEbook
000827276 983__ $$aOnline
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