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Intro; Preface; Contents; About the Author; 1 Dawn of Corporate Governance: Japan Must Change; 1.1 Japan's Stewardship Code, Corporate Governance Code, and the Ito Review (Three Pillars of Japan's Corporate Governance Reforms); 1.1.1 Japan's Stewardship Code: Principles for Responsible Institutional Investors to Promote Sustainable Growth of Companies Through Investment and Dialogue; 1.1.2 Japan's Corporate Governance Code: Seeking Sustainable Corporate Growth and Increased Corporate Value Over the Mid- to Long-Term
1.1.3 The Ito Review: Competitiveness and Incentives for Sustainable Growth Building Favorable Relationships Between Companies and Investors (Final Report)1.2 The Perspective of Global Investors and Japan's Corporate Value; References; 2 Cash Valuation Assessment of Japanese Corporations: When 100 Yen Is Valued at 50 Yen; 2.1 Why Is 100 Yen Valued as 50 Yen?: Discounting the Value of Cash Held by Japanese Companies; 2.2 Background of Cash Discount Previous Academic Research Results: 100 Yen of Japanese Company Is Worth Only 55 Yen
2.3 Latest Empirical Research on the Marginal Value of Japanese Companies' Cash-Evidence and Reconfirmation of the 50% Discount2.3.1 Research Design and Sample; 2.3.2 Empirical Results and Analysis; 2.4 85% of Overseas Investors Discount the Value of Cash Held by Japanese Companies; 2.4.1 Global Investor Survey Results; 2.4.2 Major Comments by Overseas Investors Concerning the Value of Cash Held by Japanese Companies; 2.5 How Can Japanese Companies Obtain the Market Valuation of 100 Yen as 100 Yen?; References; 3 Abenomics Requires Enhancement of Corporate Value via ROE; 3.1 What Is ROE?
3.2 Inconvenient Truth: Japan as a Low ROE Nation Primary Cause of International ROE Inferiority Is not Leverage but Margin3.2.1 Decomposition of ROE by DuPont Analysis Method, in Which the Primary Cause of the Problem Was not Leverage but Margin; 3.3 Leverage Matters (Life-Cycle Consideration and Optimal Capital Structure Needed for Value Maximization); 3.4 Global Investor Perceptions of ROE and Governance: Investors Expect to Improve ROE Through Governance Reforms; 3.4.1 Japanese Companies and Investors, and the Gap in ROE Recognition
3.5 Global Investor Survey of Japan's Version of Its Stewardship Code3.5.1 Global Investor Survey About the Corporate Governance Code; 3.6 Why Is ROE a Priority for Global Investors? ROE Is a Proxy of Shareholder Value; 3.6.1 Total Return of Shareholders Is Attributable to ROE; 3.7 Companies' Valuation of PBR Depends on ROE; 3.8 High ROE Is Partly Determined by Corporate Governance; 3.9 Japanese Companies Will Benefit from Enhancing ROE: Win-Win Situation on a Long-Term Basis; References; 4 Equity Spread and Value Creation; 4.1 "Ito Review" and Equity Spread 8% Is Magic Number
1.1.3 The Ito Review: Competitiveness and Incentives for Sustainable Growth Building Favorable Relationships Between Companies and Investors (Final Report)1.2 The Perspective of Global Investors and Japan's Corporate Value; References; 2 Cash Valuation Assessment of Japanese Corporations: When 100 Yen Is Valued at 50 Yen; 2.1 Why Is 100 Yen Valued as 50 Yen?: Discounting the Value of Cash Held by Japanese Companies; 2.2 Background of Cash Discount Previous Academic Research Results: 100 Yen of Japanese Company Is Worth Only 55 Yen
2.3 Latest Empirical Research on the Marginal Value of Japanese Companies' Cash-Evidence and Reconfirmation of the 50% Discount2.3.1 Research Design and Sample; 2.3.2 Empirical Results and Analysis; 2.4 85% of Overseas Investors Discount the Value of Cash Held by Japanese Companies; 2.4.1 Global Investor Survey Results; 2.4.2 Major Comments by Overseas Investors Concerning the Value of Cash Held by Japanese Companies; 2.5 How Can Japanese Companies Obtain the Market Valuation of 100 Yen as 100 Yen?; References; 3 Abenomics Requires Enhancement of Corporate Value via ROE; 3.1 What Is ROE?
3.2 Inconvenient Truth: Japan as a Low ROE Nation Primary Cause of International ROE Inferiority Is not Leverage but Margin3.2.1 Decomposition of ROE by DuPont Analysis Method, in Which the Primary Cause of the Problem Was not Leverage but Margin; 3.3 Leverage Matters (Life-Cycle Consideration and Optimal Capital Structure Needed for Value Maximization); 3.4 Global Investor Perceptions of ROE and Governance: Investors Expect to Improve ROE Through Governance Reforms; 3.4.1 Japanese Companies and Investors, and the Gap in ROE Recognition
3.5 Global Investor Survey of Japan's Version of Its Stewardship Code3.5.1 Global Investor Survey About the Corporate Governance Code; 3.6 Why Is ROE a Priority for Global Investors? ROE Is a Proxy of Shareholder Value; 3.6.1 Total Return of Shareholders Is Attributable to ROE; 3.7 Companies' Valuation of PBR Depends on ROE; 3.8 High ROE Is Partly Determined by Corporate Governance; 3.9 Japanese Companies Will Benefit from Enhancing ROE: Win-Win Situation on a Long-Term Basis; References; 4 Equity Spread and Value Creation; 4.1 "Ito Review" and Equity Spread 8% Is Magic Number