Game theory for security and risk management : from theory to practice / Stefan Rass, Stefan Schauer, editors.

Intro; Preface; Acknowledgements; Contents; Contributors; Part I Theory; 1 Utilizing Game Theory for Security Risk Assessment; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Risk Assessment; 1.2.1 General Risk Assessment Phases; 1.2.2 Mapping Between the General Risk Assessment and Three Selected Approaches; 1.3 Game Theory for Security Risk Assessment; 1.3.1 Game Theoretical Steps; 1.3.2 An Example Elaborating the Game Theoretical Steps; 1.3.3 Mapping Between Risk Assessment and Game-Theoretic Approaches; 1.4 Cooperative Game to Address Opportunity Risks; 1.5 Discussion and Conclusion

1.6 Chapter Notes and Further ReadingReferences; 2 Decision Making When Consequences Are Random; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Decision Making for Security: Loss Minimization; 2.2.1 A Total Stochastic Ordering Based on Moments; 2.2.2 Deciding the Stochastic Order; 2.2.2.1 Comparing Distributions to Numbers (Randomness vs. Determinism); 2.2.2.2 Distribution Mixes and Comparing Mixed Types; 2.2.3 Distributions with Infinite Support; 2.2.4 Implausible Comparisons; 2.3 Game Theory Based on; 2.4 Application of in Risk Management; 2.5 Extensions and Outlook; References

3 Security Strategies and Multi-Criteria Decision Making3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Security Games with a Single Objective; 3.3 Multi-Objective Security Games; 3.4 Computing Equilibria and Security Strategies; 3.4.1 Solution by Linear Programming; 3.4.2 Iterative Solutions by Learning; 3.4.2.1 Failure of FP in Distribution-Valued Zero-Sum Games; 3.4.2.2 Restoring Convergence of FP; 3.4.3 FP for Multi-Goal Security Strategies; 3.5 Final Remarks; References; 4 A Scalable Decomposition Method for the Dynamic Defense of Cyber Networks; 4.1 Introduction; 4.1.1 Organization of the Chapter; 4.1.2 Notation

4.2 The Security Model4.3 The Defense Problem; 4.3.1 Information State; 4.3.2 Sequential Decomposition and Dynamic Programming; 4.4 Approximation to the Defense Problem; 4.4.1 Local Defense Problems; 4.4.1.1 Preliminaries; 4.4.1.2 Functional Dependencies and the Notion of an Influence Graph; 4.4.1.3 Formulating the Local Defense Problems; 4.4.2 Approximating the Local Defense Problems; 4.4.3 Scalability; 4.5 Example; 4.6 Discussion and Conclusion; References; 5 Factored Markov Game Theory for Secure Interdependent Infrastructure Networks; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Mathematical Model

5.2.1 Network Game Model5.2.2 Zero-Sum Markov Games; 5.2.3 Mathematical Programming Perspective; 5.2.4 Single-Controller Markov Game; 5.3 Factored Markov Game; 5.3.1 Factored Structure; 5.3.2 Linear Function Approximation; 5.3.3 Term Reorganization; 5.3.4 Restricted Information Structure; 5.3.5 Variable Elimination; 5.3.6 Distributed Policy of Attacker; 5.3.7 Approximate Dual LP; 5.4 Numerical Experiments; 5.4.1 Transition Probability and Cost; 5.4.2 Approximation Accuracy; 5.4.3 Various Information Structure; 5.4.4 Network Effect; 5.4.5 Optimal Policy; 5.5 Conclusion