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Table of Contents
Intro; Introduction; Reference; Contents; List of Figures; Chapter 1: Protecting Process Industries from Intentional Attacks: The State of the Art; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Safety and Security Definitions and Differences; 1.3 Security in a Single Chemical Plant; 1.3.1 The Need of Improving Security in Chemical Plants; 1.3.2 Challenges with Respect to Improving Chemical Security; 1.3.3 Security Risk Assessment in Chemical Plants: State-of-the-Art Research; 1.3.4 Drawbacks of Current Methodologies; 1.4 Protection of Chemical Industrial Parks (CIPs) or So-Called Chemical Clusters
1.4.1 Security Within Chemical Clusters1.4.2 Chemical Cluster Security: State-of-the-Art Research; 1.4.3 Future Promising Research Directions on Cluster Security; 1.5 Conclusion; References; Chapter 2: Intelligent Interaction Modelling: Game Theory; 2.1 Preliminaries of Game Theory, Setting the Scene; 2.1.1 Introduction; 2.1.2 Players; 2.1.3 Strategy (Set); 2.1.4 Payoff; 2.1.5 The Assumption of `Common Knowledge;́ 2.1.6 The Assumption of `Rationality;́ 2.1.7 Simultaneous and Sequential Game; 2.2 Game Theoretic Models with a Discrete Set of Strategies
2.2.1 Discrete and Continuous Set of Strategies2.2.2 Nash Equilibrium; 2.2.3 Stackelberg Equilibrium; 2.3 Criticisms on Game Theoretic Models for Security Improvement; 2.4 Integrating Conventional Security Risk Assessment Methodologies and Game Theory for Improving Chemical Plant Protection; 2.5 Conclusion; References; Chapter 3: Single Plant Protection: A Game-Theoretical Model for Improving Chemical Plant Protection; 3.1 General Intrusion Detection Approach in Chemical Plants; 3.2 Game-Theoretical Modelling: The Chemical Plant Protection Game (CPP Game); 3.2.1 Players; 3.2.2 Strategies
3.2.3 Payoffs3.3 Solutions for the CPP Game; 3.3.1 Nash Equilibrium; 3.3.2 Stackelberg Equilibrium; 3.3.3 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium; 3.3.4 Bayesian Stackelberg Equilibrium; 3.4 CPP Game from an Industrial Practice Point of View; 3.4.1 Input Analysis; 3.4.2 Output Analysis; 3.5 Conclusion; References; Chapter 4: Single Plant Protection: Playing the Chemical Plant Protection Game with Distribution-Free Uncertainties; 4.1 Motivation; 4.2 Interval CPP Game Definition; 4.3 Interval Bi-Matrix Game Solver (IBGS); 4.4 Parameter Coupling; 4.5 Interval CPP Game Solver (ICGS); 4.6 Conclusion; References
Chapter 5: Single Plant Protection: Playing the Chemical Plant Protection Game Involving Attackers with Bounded Rationality5.1 Motivation; 5.2 Epsilon-Optimal Attacker; 5.2.1 Definition of an `Epsilon-Optimal Attacker;́ 5.2.2 Game Modelling of the `Epsilon-Optimal Attacker;́ 5.2.3 Solving the CPP Game with `Epsilon-Optimal Attackers;́ 5.3 Monotonic Optimal Attacker; 5.3.1 Definition of a `Monotonic Optimal Attacker;́ 5.3.2 Game Modelling of the `Monotonic Optimal Attacker;́ 5.3.3 Calculating the MoSICP; 5.4 MiniMax Attacker; 5.4.1 Definition of a `MiniMax Attackeŕ
1.4.1 Security Within Chemical Clusters1.4.2 Chemical Cluster Security: State-of-the-Art Research; 1.4.3 Future Promising Research Directions on Cluster Security; 1.5 Conclusion; References; Chapter 2: Intelligent Interaction Modelling: Game Theory; 2.1 Preliminaries of Game Theory, Setting the Scene; 2.1.1 Introduction; 2.1.2 Players; 2.1.3 Strategy (Set); 2.1.4 Payoff; 2.1.5 The Assumption of `Common Knowledge;́ 2.1.6 The Assumption of `Rationality;́ 2.1.7 Simultaneous and Sequential Game; 2.2 Game Theoretic Models with a Discrete Set of Strategies
2.2.1 Discrete and Continuous Set of Strategies2.2.2 Nash Equilibrium; 2.2.3 Stackelberg Equilibrium; 2.3 Criticisms on Game Theoretic Models for Security Improvement; 2.4 Integrating Conventional Security Risk Assessment Methodologies and Game Theory for Improving Chemical Plant Protection; 2.5 Conclusion; References; Chapter 3: Single Plant Protection: A Game-Theoretical Model for Improving Chemical Plant Protection; 3.1 General Intrusion Detection Approach in Chemical Plants; 3.2 Game-Theoretical Modelling: The Chemical Plant Protection Game (CPP Game); 3.2.1 Players; 3.2.2 Strategies
3.2.3 Payoffs3.3 Solutions for the CPP Game; 3.3.1 Nash Equilibrium; 3.3.2 Stackelberg Equilibrium; 3.3.3 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium; 3.3.4 Bayesian Stackelberg Equilibrium; 3.4 CPP Game from an Industrial Practice Point of View; 3.4.1 Input Analysis; 3.4.2 Output Analysis; 3.5 Conclusion; References; Chapter 4: Single Plant Protection: Playing the Chemical Plant Protection Game with Distribution-Free Uncertainties; 4.1 Motivation; 4.2 Interval CPP Game Definition; 4.3 Interval Bi-Matrix Game Solver (IBGS); 4.4 Parameter Coupling; 4.5 Interval CPP Game Solver (ICGS); 4.6 Conclusion; References
Chapter 5: Single Plant Protection: Playing the Chemical Plant Protection Game Involving Attackers with Bounded Rationality5.1 Motivation; 5.2 Epsilon-Optimal Attacker; 5.2.1 Definition of an `Epsilon-Optimal Attacker;́ 5.2.2 Game Modelling of the `Epsilon-Optimal Attacker;́ 5.2.3 Solving the CPP Game with `Epsilon-Optimal Attackers;́ 5.3 Monotonic Optimal Attacker; 5.3.1 Definition of a `Monotonic Optimal Attacker;́ 5.3.2 Game Modelling of the `Monotonic Optimal Attacker;́ 5.3.3 Calculating the MoSICP; 5.4 MiniMax Attacker; 5.4.1 Definition of a `MiniMax Attackeŕ