Intro; Preface; Contents; Contributors; 1 Countervailing Power with Large and Small Retailers; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 The Model; 1.3 Equilibrium; 1.4 The Effects of Concentration and Bargaining Power on Retail Prices; 1.5 Conclusion; Appendix; Derivation of the Reaction Function of the Large Retailer qm(Q-m); Derivation of Bargaining Outcome (1.11) and (1.12); References; 2 Dynamic Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: The Recursive Nash Bargaining Solution; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Problem Statement; 2.3 Solution Concepts; 2.3.1 Collusive Solution; 2.3.2 Noncooperative Equilibrium

2.3.3 Bargaining Solution2.4 Conclusion; References; 3 Altruistic, Aggressive and Paradoxical Types of Behavior in a Differential Two-Person Game; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Some Results from the Theory of Non-antagonistic Positional Differential Games (NPDG) of Two Persons; 3.3 A Non-antagonistic Positional Differential Games with Behavior Types (NPDGwBT): BT-Solution; 3.4 Example; 3.5 Conclusion; References; 4 Learning in a Game of Strategic Experimentation with Three-Armed Exponential Bandits; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Model Setup; 4.3 Complete Learning; 4.4 Equilibrium Payoff Functions

4.4.1 Low Stakes4.4.2 Intermediate Stakes; 4.5 Conclusion; 4.6 Proofs; 4.6.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1; 4.6.2 Proof of Proposition 4.2; 4.6.3 Proof of Proposition 4.3; References; 5 Solution for a System of Hamilton-Jacobi Equations of Special Type and a Link with Nash Equilibrium; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Bilevel Optimal Control Problem; 5.3 The Solution of the System of the Hamilton-Jacobi Equations; 5.4 Design of Nash Equilibrium; 5.5 Example; References; 6 The Impact of Discounted Indices on Equilibrium Strategies of Players in Dynamical Bimatrix Games; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 Model Dynamics

6.3 Local Payoff Functions6.4 Nash Equilibrium in the Differential Game with Discounted Functionals; 6.5 Auxiliary Zero-Sum Games; 6.6 Construction of the Dynamical Nash Equilibrium; 6.7 Two-Step Optimal Control Problems; 6.8 The Solution of the Two-Step Optimal Control Problem; 6.9 Guaranteed Values of Discounted Payoffs; 6.10 Equilibrium Trajectories in the Game with Discounted Payoffs; References; 7 On Control Reconstruction Problems for Dynamic Systems Linear in Controls; 7.1 Introduction; 7.2 Dynamics; 7.3 Input Data; 7.4 Hypotheses; 7.5 Problem Statement

7.6 A Solution of the Inverse Problem7.6.1 Auxiliary Problem; 7.6.2 Necessary Optimality Conditions in the AVP; 7.6.3 A Solution of the Reconstruction Problem; 7.6.4 Convergence of the Solution; 7.7 Remarks on the Suggested Method; 7.8 Example; References; 8 Evolution of Risk-Statuses in One Model of Tax Control; 8.1 Introduction; 8.2 Static Model of Tax Audit; 8.3 Model with Different Risk-Statuses; 8.4 The Evolutionary Model on the Network; 8.4.1 The Model Based on the Markov Process on the Network; 8.4.2 The Model Based on the Proportional Imitation Rule; 8.5 Numerical Simulations