000864470 000__ 05778cam\a2200433\i\4500
000864470 001__ 864470
000864470 005__ 20210515162325.0
000864470 006__ m\\\\\o\\d\\\\\\\\
000864470 007__ cr\cn\nnnunnun
000864470 008__ 140613s2015\\\\nyu\\\\\ob\\\\001\0\eng\d
000864470 020__ $$z9780199987405 
000864470 020__ $$a9780199987412 $$q(electronic book)
000864470 035__ $$a(MiAaPQ)EBC1876205
000864470 035__ $$a(Au-PeEL)EBL1876205
000864470 035__ $$a(CaPaEBR)ebr10991248
000864470 035__ $$a(CaONFJC)MIL664918
000864470 035__ $$a(OCoLC)897645611
000864470 040__ $$aMiAaPQ$$beng$$erda$$epn$$cMiAaPQ$$dMiAaPQ
000864470 043__ $$an-us---
000864470 050_4 $$aKF4581$$b.O35 2015
000864470 0820_ $$a340.90973$$223
000864470 1001_ $$aOhlin, Jens David,$$eauthor.
000864470 24514 $$aThe assault on international law /$$cJens David Ohlin.
000864470 264_1 $$aNew York, New York :$$bOxford University Press,$$c2015.
000864470 300__ $$a1 online resource (304 pages)
000864470 336__ $$atext$$2rdacontent
000864470 337__ $$acomputer$$2rdamedia
000864470 338__ $$aonline resource$$2rdacarrier
000864470 504__ $$aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
000864470 5058_ $$aMachine generated contents note: -- PROLOGUE: DRAMATIS PERSONAE -- 1. The Office of Legal Counsel -- 2. The Emergence of the New Realists -- 3. Conclusion -- CHAPTER ONE: GAMING THE FEDERAL COURTS -- 1. The Erie Doctrine 2.0 -- 2. The Filartiga Era: Enforcing International Law at Home -- 3. Filartiga's Demise, Parochialism's Rise -- 4. The New Realists go to Washington -- 5. International Law as Interpretive Guidance -- 6. Conclusion -- CHAPTER TWO: PRESIDENTS AND LEVIATHANS -- 1. Public Opinion and Law -- 2. Presidential Power: The New Realist's Normative Argument -- 3. Democratic Decision-making versus Schmittology -- 4. Executive Action During Emergencies -- 5. Why Schmittian Administrative Law is Not Inevitable -- 6. Conclusion -- CHAPTER THREE: THE ATTACK: MISUNDERSTANDING RATIONALITY -- 1. The Game Theory Game -- 2. The Prisoner's Dilemma and Nash Equilibrium -- 3. Law and Self-Interest -- 4. Objections to the Moral Obligation of States -- CHAPTER FOUR: SOLVING THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW -- 1. The Toxin Puzzle and Taking the Long View -- 2. The Deterrence Paradox and the Limits of Follow-Through -- 3. Assurances and Cooperation -- 4. Why the New Realists Fail to Understand Rationality -- 5. Rationality and Obligation -- CHAPTER FIVE: WAR AS COOPERATION -- 1. War as Cooperation -- 2. Who can be Targeted? Combatants, Civilians, and CCFers -- 3. Geographical Constraints on Armed Conflict -- 4. Co-Applying the Laws of War with Human Rights -- CHAPTER 6: REENGAGING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS -- 1. Global Legalism vs. Rational Choice: A False Dichotomy -- 2. Does Globalization Need Taming? -- 3. The United Nations -- 4. The International Court of Justice -- 5. The International Criminal Court.
000864470 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
000864470 520__ $$a"International law presents a conceptual riddle.  Why comply with it when there is no world government to enforce it? The United States has a long history of skepticism towards international law, but 9/11 ushered in a particularly virulent phase of American exceptionalism. Torture became official government policy, President Bush denied that the Geneva Conventions applied to the war against al-Qaeda, and the US drifted away from international institutions like the International Criminal Court and the United Nations.  Although American politicians and their legal advisors are often the public face of this attack, the root of this movement is a coordinated and deliberate attack by law professors hostile to its philosophical foundations, including Eric Posner, Jack Goldsmith, Adrian Vermeule, and John Yoo.  In a series of influential writings they have claimed that since states are motivated primarily by self-interest, compliance with international law is nothing more than high-minded talk.  Theses abstract arguments then provide a foundation for dangerous legal conclusions: that international law is largely irrelevant to determining how and when terrorists can be captured or killed; that the US President alone should be directing the War on Terror without significant input from Congress or the judiciary; that US courts should not hear lawsuits alleging violations of international law; and that the US should block any international criminal court with jurisdiction over Americans.  Put together, these polemical accounts had an enormous impact on how politicians conduct foreign policy and how judges decide cases - ultimately triggering America's pernicious withdrawal from international cooperation.  In The Assault on International Law, Jens Ohlin exposes the mistaken assumptions of these 'New Realists,' in particular their impoverished utilization of rational choice theory. In contrast, he provides an alternate vision of international law based on a truly innovative theory of human rationality. According to Ohlin, rationality requires that agents follow through on their plans even when faced with opportunities for defection. Seen in this light, international law is the product of nation-states cooperating to escape a brutish State of Nature--a result that is not only legally binding but also in each state's self-interest"--$$cProvided by publisher.
000864470 588__ $$aDescription based on print version record.
000864470 650_0 $$aInternational and municipal law$$zUnited States.
000864470 650_0 $$aInternational law$$zUnited States.
000864470 77608 $$iPrint version:$$aOhlin, Jens David.$$tAssault on international law.$$dNew York, New York : Oxford University Press, 2015$$z9780199987405$$w(DLC)10991248
000864470 852__ $$bebk
000864470 85640 $$3ProQuest Ebook Central Academic Complete$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/usiricelib-ebooks/detail.action?docID=1876205$$zOnline Access
000864470 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:864470$$pGLOBAL_SET
000864470 980__ $$aEBOOK
000864470 980__ $$aBIB
000864470 982__ $$aEbook
000864470 983__ $$aOnline