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Table of Contents
Intro; Preface; Acknowledgments; A Note from Peter Klein; Contents; Contributors; Chapter 1: Introduction; 1.1 Knowledge (Chaps. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7); 1.2 Skepticism (Chaps. 8, 9, and 10); 1.3 Justification (Chaps. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15); References; Part I: Knowledge; Chapter 2: Reflective Knowledge; 2.1 Enhancing Knowledge; 2.2 Praxis; 2.3 Rational Self-Correction; 2.4 Consequences for Belief; 2.5 Responding Appropriately; References; Chapter 3: Epistemically Useful Falsehoods; 3.1 Kleinś Account; 3.2 Concerns; 3.3 Alternative Proposal; 3.4 Conclusions; References
Chapter 4: Theoretical Unity in Epistemology4.1 Introduction; 4.2 The Main Tasks; 4.3 Knowledge-First Epistemology; 4.4 A Reasons-Based Alternative; 4.5 A Confirmational Approach; 4.6 Conclusion; References; Chapter 5: Accurate Enough, Comprehensive Enough, and Reasonable Enough Belief; 5.1 The Basic Claim; 5.2 Some Recent History; 5.3 Knowledge, Justification, Reliability; 5.4 Knowledge, Justification, Reliability Reconsidered; 5.5 Loosening the Link; References; Chapter 6: Knowledge, despite Evidence to the Contrary; 6.1 Headache and Weather; 6.2 Marbles
6.3 Weak and Strong Views of Knowledge6.4 Defeasibility and Weak Knowledge; 6.5 The Defeat Intuition; 6.6 Strong Knowledge and Defeat; References; Chapter 7: A Causal Aspect of Epistemic Basing; 7.1 The Importance of Being Superstitious or Prejudiced; 7.2 Originating versus Sustaining; 7.3 Speculation and Introspection; 7.4 Apprehending Causation; 7.5 A Non-disjunctive Condition of Basing; 7.6 Factoring in Differentiating Factors; 7.7 Privations and Causation; 7.8 Prevention, Sustainment, and the Possibility of Existential Inertia; 7.9 Enough; 7.10 The Explanatory Upshot
7.11 Is `Enough ́Enough?7.12 Similarities to Disagreements over Causal Selection; 7.13 The Unimportance of Superstition and Prejudice; 7.14 A Needed Refinement; 7.15 An Illustration: The Possibility of an Extended Reliabilism; 7.16 The Future of an Illusion?; References; Part II: Scepticism; Chapter 8: The Moral Transcendental Argument against Skepticism; 8.1 Introduction; 8.2 The Transcendental Argument from Rational Agency; 8.3 Vat Morality; 8.3.1 Moral Obligation; 8.3.2 Virtue; 8.4 The Moral Transcendental Arguments; 8.4.1 The Weak Moral Transcendental Arguments
8.4.2 The Strong Moral Transcendental Argument8.4.3 The Strong (Non-transcendental) Argument from the Categorical Imperative (CI); 8.5 Can the Skeptic Retreat to Pyrrhonism?; References; Chapter 9: Epistemic Humility, Defeat, and a Defense of Moderate Skepticism; 9.1 Introduction; 9.2 An Argument for Direct Skepticism, and Kleinś Objection; 9.3 Internalism and Evidentialism; 9.4 Epistemic Limitations and Epistemic Humility; 9.5 Defeasibility and the Analysis of Knowledge; 9.6 Epistemic Limitations and Defeat; 9.7 An Argument for Moderate Skepticism
Chapter 4: Theoretical Unity in Epistemology4.1 Introduction; 4.2 The Main Tasks; 4.3 Knowledge-First Epistemology; 4.4 A Reasons-Based Alternative; 4.5 A Confirmational Approach; 4.6 Conclusion; References; Chapter 5: Accurate Enough, Comprehensive Enough, and Reasonable Enough Belief; 5.1 The Basic Claim; 5.2 Some Recent History; 5.3 Knowledge, Justification, Reliability; 5.4 Knowledge, Justification, Reliability Reconsidered; 5.5 Loosening the Link; References; Chapter 6: Knowledge, despite Evidence to the Contrary; 6.1 Headache and Weather; 6.2 Marbles
6.3 Weak and Strong Views of Knowledge6.4 Defeasibility and Weak Knowledge; 6.5 The Defeat Intuition; 6.6 Strong Knowledge and Defeat; References; Chapter 7: A Causal Aspect of Epistemic Basing; 7.1 The Importance of Being Superstitious or Prejudiced; 7.2 Originating versus Sustaining; 7.3 Speculation and Introspection; 7.4 Apprehending Causation; 7.5 A Non-disjunctive Condition of Basing; 7.6 Factoring in Differentiating Factors; 7.7 Privations and Causation; 7.8 Prevention, Sustainment, and the Possibility of Existential Inertia; 7.9 Enough; 7.10 The Explanatory Upshot
7.11 Is `Enough ́Enough?7.12 Similarities to Disagreements over Causal Selection; 7.13 The Unimportance of Superstition and Prejudice; 7.14 A Needed Refinement; 7.15 An Illustration: The Possibility of an Extended Reliabilism; 7.16 The Future of an Illusion?; References; Part II: Scepticism; Chapter 8: The Moral Transcendental Argument against Skepticism; 8.1 Introduction; 8.2 The Transcendental Argument from Rational Agency; 8.3 Vat Morality; 8.3.1 Moral Obligation; 8.3.2 Virtue; 8.4 The Moral Transcendental Arguments; 8.4.1 The Weak Moral Transcendental Arguments
8.4.2 The Strong Moral Transcendental Argument8.4.3 The Strong (Non-transcendental) Argument from the Categorical Imperative (CI); 8.5 Can the Skeptic Retreat to Pyrrhonism?; References; Chapter 9: Epistemic Humility, Defeat, and a Defense of Moderate Skepticism; 9.1 Introduction; 9.2 An Argument for Direct Skepticism, and Kleinś Objection; 9.3 Internalism and Evidentialism; 9.4 Epistemic Limitations and Epistemic Humility; 9.5 Defeasibility and the Analysis of Knowledge; 9.6 Epistemic Limitations and Defeat; 9.7 An Argument for Moderate Skepticism