Counterinsurgency intellignece and the emergency in Malaya / Roger C. Arditti.
2019
DS597 .C68 2019
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Title
Counterinsurgency intellignece and the emergency in Malaya / Roger C. Arditti.
ISBN
9783030166953 (electronic book)
3030166953 (electronic book)
3030166945
9783030166946
Published
Cham, Switzerland : Palgrave Macmillan, [2019]
Language
English
Description
1 online resource.
Call Number
DS597 .C68 2019
Dewey Decimal Classification
959.5104
Summary
This book examines the full range of counterinsurgency intelligence during the Malayan Emergency. It explores the involvement of the Security Service, the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East), the Malayan Security Service, Special Branch and wider police service, and military intelligence, to examine how British and Malayan authorities tackled the insurgent challenge posed by the Malayan Communist Party. This study assesses the nature of the intelligence apparatus prior to the declaration of emergency in 1948 and considers how officials attempted to reconstruct the intelligence structures in the Far East after the surrender of the Japanese in 1945. These plans were largely based upon the legacy of the Second World War but quickly ran into difficultly because of ill-defined remits and personality clashes. Nevertheless, officials did provide prescient warning of the existential threat posed by the Malayan Communist Party from the earliest days of British reoccupation of Malaya. Once a state of emergency had been declared, officials struggled to find the right combination of methods, strategy and management structures to eliminate the threat posed by the Communist insurgents. This book argues that the development of an effective counterinsurgency intelligence strategy involved many more organisations than just Special Branch. It was a multifaceted, dynamic effort that took far longer and was more problematic than previous accounts suggest. The Emergency remains central to counterinsurgency theory and thus this wide-ranging analysis sheds crucial light not only on the period, but on contemporary doctrine and security practices today.
Note
This book examines the full range of counterinsurgency intelligence during the Malayan Emergency. It explores the involvement of the Security Service, the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East), the Malayan Security Service, Special Branch and wider police service, and military intelligence, to examine how British and Malayan authorities tackled the insurgent challenge posed by the Malayan Communist Party. This study assesses the nature of the intelligence apparatus prior to the declaration of emergency in 1948 and considers how officials attempted to reconstruct the intelligence structures in the Far East after the surrender of the Japanese in 1945. These plans were largely based upon the legacy of the Second World War but quickly ran into difficultly because of ill-defined remits and personality clashes. Nevertheless, officials did provide prescient warning of the existential threat posed by the Malayan Communist Party from the earliest days of British reoccupation of Malaya. Once a state of emergency had been declared, officials struggled to find the right combination of methods, strategy and management structures to eliminate the threat posed by the Communist insurgents. This book argues that the development of an effective counterinsurgency intelligence strategy involved many more organisations than just Special Branch. It was a multifaceted, dynamic effort that took far longer and was more problematic than previous accounts suggest. The Emergency remains central to counterinsurgency theory and thus this wide-ranging analysis sheds crucial light not only on the period, but on contemporary doctrine and security practices today.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Access Note
Access limited to authorized users.
Source of Description
Description based on online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on May 22, 2019).
Series
Security, conflict and cooperation in the contemporary world.
Available in Other Form
COUNTERINSURGENCY INTELLIGENCE AND THE EMERGENCY IN MALAYA, 1945-1960.
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Intro; Acknowledgements; Contents; Abbreviations; Dramatis Personae; Timeline; Chapter 1 Introduction; A Note About Language; Chapter 2 Status Quo Ante; The Joint Intelligence Committee System; Intelligence Management in the Middle East; Intelligence in the Far East; Conclusion; Chapter 3 Creating a New Intelligence Apparatus in the Far East; The Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East); The Security Service in the Far East; The Origins of the Malayan Security Service; Conclusion; Chapter 4 Organisational Conflict; The Malayan Security Service; The Security Service

The Relationship Between SIFE and MSSJoint Intelligence Committee (Far East); Conclusion; Chapter 5 Intelligence Prior to the Declaration of Emergency; The MCP's Intent to Subvert Malaya, C. 1945-1947; The Capability of the MCP, C. 1945-1947; Intelligence Reporting in the Months Prior to the Declaration of Emergency; The Declaration of a State of Emergency; Conclusion; Chapter 6 Paramilitary Intelligence; The Initial Plan to Restore Law and Order; Visual Reconnaissance; Intelligence on the Ground; Intelligence and Squatters; The Briggs Plan; Operational Refinement; Surrendered Enemy Personal

ConclusionChapter 7 Policing and Human Intelligence; Colonial Policing; The Relationship Between the Uniformed and Special Branches; Enforcement of Emergency Regulations; Recognition of Failure; Reconstructing Malayan Police Service; Conclusion; Chapter 8 Organising Intelligence; Initial Intelligence Coordination; Strategic Intelligence Cooperation; Formalising Operational Intelligence Coordination; Changes at the Top; Further Operational Refinement; The 'Mature' Intelligence Model; Conclusion; Chapter 9 Conclusion; Relationship to Current Counterinsurgency Theory

The Mythical Blue Print for Intelligence?Indicator and Warnings; Agency Adaptation; All Source Intelligence; Strategic Direction; Final Thoughts; Appendix A: The Ballad of the SACK and SINK; Bibliography; Index

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