Securities against misrule [electronic resource] : juries, assemblies, elections / Jon Elster.
2013
JF1051 .E47 2013
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Title
Securities against misrule [electronic resource] : juries, assemblies, elections / Jon Elster.
Author
Elster, Jon, 1940-
ISBN
9781107031739
9781107649958
9781107306936 (electronic book)
9781107649958
9781107306936 (electronic book)
Publication Details
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Language
English
Description
xii, 324 p. : ill.
Call Number
JF1051 .E47 2013
Dewey Decimal Classification
302.3
Summary
"This book proposes a normative theory of collective decision making, inspired by Jeremy Bentham but not including his utilitarian philosophy. The central proposal is that in designing democratic institutions one should reduce as much as possible the impact of self-interest, passion, prejudice, and bias on the decision makers, and then let the chips fall where they may. There is no independently defined good outcome that institutions can track, nor is there any way of reliably selecting good decision makers. In addition to a long initial chapter that surveys theories of collective decision making, notably social-choice theory, and a chapter expounding and discussing Bentham,Ŵs views, historical chapters on the jury, constituent assemblies, and electoral systems develop and illustrate the main ideas. This work draws on a welter of case studies and historical episodes, from Thucydides and Plutarch to the present. It is also grounded in psychology, behavioral economics, and law"-- Provided by publisher.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
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Access limited to authorized users.
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