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000890092 019__ $$a1020576906
000890092 020__ $$a9783319740331$$q(electronic book)
000890092 020__ $$a3319740334$$q(electronic book)
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000890092 050_4 $$aJF1001
000890092 08204 $$a324.6/5$$223
000890092 1001_ $$aFelsenthal, Dan S.,$$eauthor.
000890092 24510 $$aVoting procedures for electing a single candidate :$$bproving their (in)vulnerability to various voting paradoxes /$$cDan S. Felsenthal, Hannu Nurmi.
000890092 264_1 $$aCham, Switzerland :$$bSpringer,$$c[2018]
000890092 264_4 $$c©2018
000890092 300__ $$a1 online resource.
000890092 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
000890092 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
000890092 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
000890092 4901_ $$aSpringerBriefs in economics
000890092 504__ $$aIncludes bibliographical references.
000890092 5050_ $$aIntro; Preface; References; Contents; 1 Introduction; Abstract; Exercises; Answers to Exercises; References; 2 Voting Paradoxes; Abstract; 2.1 Simple Paradoxes; 2.1.1 The Condorcet Winner Paradox (Condorcet de 1785; Black 1958); 2.1.2 The Absolute Majority Winner Paradox; 2.1.3 The Condorcet Loser or Borda Paradox (Borda de 1784; Black 1958); 2.1.4 The Absolute Majority Loser Paradox; 2.1.5 The Pareto (or Dominated Candidate) Paradox (Fishburn 1974); 2.2 Conditional Paradoxes; 2.2.1 Additional Support (or Lack of Monotonicity or Negative Responsiveness) Paradox (Smith 1973; Fishburn 1974a
000890092 5058_ $$aFishburn and Brams 1983)2.2.2 Reinforcement (or Inconsistency or Multiple Districts) Paradox (Young 1974); 2.2.3 Truncation Paradox (Brams 1982; Fishburn and Brams 1983); 2.2.4 No-Show Paradox (Fishburn and Brams 1983; Ray 1986; Moulin 1988b; Holzman 1988/1989; Perez 1995); 2.2.5 Twin Paradox (Moulin 1988b); 2.2.6 Violation of the Subset Choice Condition (SCC) (Fishburn 1974b, c; 1977); 2.2.7 Preference Inversion Paradox; 2.2.8 Dependence on Order of Voting (DOV) Paradox (Farquharson 1969); Exercises; Answers to Exercises; References
000890092 5058_ $$a3 Voting Procedures Designed to Elect a Single CandidateAbstract; 3.1 Non-Ranked Voting Procedures; 3.1.1 Plurality Voting (aka First Past the Post) Procedure; 3.1.2 Plurality with Runoff Voting Procedure; 3.1.3 Approval Voting (Brams and Fishburn 1978, 1983); 3.1.4 Successive Elimination (Farquharson 1969); 3.2 Ranked Voting Procedures that are not Condorcet-Consistent; 3.2.1 Borda's Count (Borda 1784; Black 1958); 3.2.2 Alternative Vote (aka Instant Runoff); 3.2.3 Coombs' Method (Coombs 1964, pp. 397-399; Straffin 1980; Coombs et al. 1984)
000890092 5058_ $$a3.2.4 Bucklin's Method (Hoag and Hallett 1926, pp. 485-491 Tideman 2006, p. 203); 3.2.5 Range Voting (Smith 2000); 3.2.6 Majority Judgment (Balinski and Laraki 2007a, b, 2011); 3.3 Ranked Voting Procedures that are Condorcet-Consistent; 3.3.1 The Minimax Procedure; 3.3.2 Dodgson's Procedure (Black 1958, pp. 222-234; McLean and Urken, 1995, pp. 288-297); 3.3.3 Nanson's Method (Nanson 1883; McLean and Urken 1995, Ch. 14); 3.3.4 Copeland's Method (Copeland 1951); 3.3.5 Black's Method (Black 1958, p. 66); 3.3.6 Kemeny's Method (Kemeny 1959; Kemeny and Snell 1960
000890092 5058_ $$aYoung and Levenglick 1978 Young 1988, 1995); 3.3.7 Schwartz's Method (Schwartz 1972, 1986); 3.3.8 Young's Method (Young 1977); Exercises; Answers to Exercises; References; 4 The (In)Vulnerability of Non-Ranked Voting Procedures to Various Paradoxes; Abstract; 4.1 The (In)Vulnerability of the Plurality Voting Procedure to Various Paradoxes; 4.1.1 The Condorcet Winner, the Condorcet Loser, the Absolute Majority Loser, the Preference Inversion, and the SCC Paradoxes; 4.1.1.1 Example; 4.1.2 Absolute Majority Winner Paradox; 4.1.3 Pareto-Dominated Candidate Paradox
000890092 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
000890092 520__ $$aThis book deals with 18 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid paradoxical outcomes. Together with a companion volume by the same authors, Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate, published by Springer in 2017, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of procedures thereby assisting decision makers in the choice of a voting procedure that would best suit their purposes.
000890092 588__ $$aOnline resource; title from PDF title page (viewed January 31, 2018).
000890092 650_0 $$aVoting$$xSocial aspects.
000890092 7001_ $$aNurmi, Hannu,$$eauthor.
000890092 77608 $$iPrint version $$z3319740326$$z9783319740324$$w(OCoLC)1015862247
000890092 830_0 $$aSpringerBriefs in economics.
000890092 852__ $$bebk
000890092 85640 $$3SpringerLink$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-319-74033-1$$zOnline Access$$91397441.1
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