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In Lieu of an Introduction: How I Remember Leonid Hurwicz
Institution Design: Technical Change and the Decentralization Penalty
Fundamental Theory of Institutions: a Lecture in Honor of Leo Hurwicz
The Hurwicz Program, Past and Suggestions for the Future
Social Networks from a Designer's Viewpoint
Design Under Uncertainties: Some Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism Design
Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does Not Know Endowments
Design of Tradable Permit Programs Under Imprecise Measurement
Second Thoughts of Social Dilemma in Mechanism Design
Markets: Allocation Mechanisms, Incentives, and Endemic Institutional Externalities
The Role of (quasi) Analyticity in Establishing Completeness of Financial Markets Equilibria
Are We There Yet? Mechanism Design Beyond Equilibrium
Rules: Formation of Committees Through Random Voting Rules
Equal Area Rule to Adjudicate Conflicting Claims
Implementation: Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information
Unrestricted Domain Extensions of Dominant Strategy Implementable Allocation Functions
Self-Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences in Strong Equilibrium
New Directions in Design: Domains Admitting ex post Incentive Compatible and Respectful Mechanisms: a Characterization for the Two Alternatives Case
Mechanisms in a Digitalized World
Incentive Compatibility on the Blockchain
Contextual Mechanism Design.
Institution Design: Technical Change and the Decentralization Penalty
Fundamental Theory of Institutions: a Lecture in Honor of Leo Hurwicz
The Hurwicz Program, Past and Suggestions for the Future
Social Networks from a Designer's Viewpoint
Design Under Uncertainties: Some Remarks on Bayesian Mechanism Design
Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does Not Know Endowments
Design of Tradable Permit Programs Under Imprecise Measurement
Second Thoughts of Social Dilemma in Mechanism Design
Markets: Allocation Mechanisms, Incentives, and Endemic Institutional Externalities
The Role of (quasi) Analyticity in Establishing Completeness of Financial Markets Equilibria
Are We There Yet? Mechanism Design Beyond Equilibrium
Rules: Formation of Committees Through Random Voting Rules
Equal Area Rule to Adjudicate Conflicting Claims
Implementation: Recent Results on Implementation with Complete Information
Unrestricted Domain Extensions of Dominant Strategy Implementable Allocation Functions
Self-Implementation of Social Choice Correspondences in Strong Equilibrium
New Directions in Design: Domains Admitting ex post Incentive Compatible and Respectful Mechanisms: a Characterization for the Two Alternatives Case
Mechanisms in a Digitalized World
Incentive Compatibility on the Blockchain
Contextual Mechanism Design.