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000891496 019__ $$a1107586851
000891496 020__ $$a9783030155902$$q(electronic book)
000891496 020__ $$a3030155900$$q(electronic book)
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000891496 050_4 $$aK201-487B65K140-165B
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000891496 1001_ $$aChiassoni, Pierluigi.
000891496 24510 $$aInterpretation without truth :$$ba realistic enquiry /$$cPierluigi Chiassoni.
000891496 260__ $$aCham, Switzerland :$$bSpringer,$$c2019.
000891496 300__ $$a1 online resource
000891496 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
000891496 337__ $$acomputer$$bc$$2rdamedia
000891496 338__ $$aonline resource$$bcr$$2rdacarrier
000891496 4901_ $$aLaw and Philosophy Library ;$$vv.128
000891496 504__ $$aIncludes bibliographical references.
000891496 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
000891496 520__ $$aThis book engages in an analytical and realistic enquiry into legal interpretation and a selection of related matters including legal gaps, judicial fictions, judicial precedent, legal defeasibility, and legislation. Chapter 1 provides an outline of the central theoretical and methodological tenets of analytical realism. Chapter 2 presents a conceptual apparatus concerning the phenomenon of legal interpretation, which it subsequently applies to investigate the truth-in-legal-interpretation issue. Chapters 3 to 6 argue for a theory of legal interpretation - pragmatic realism - by outlining a theory of interpretive games, revisiting the debate between literalism and contextualism in contemporary philosophy of language, and underscoring the many shortcomings of the container-retrieval view and pragmatic formalism. In turn, Chapter 7, focusing on comparative legal theory, advocates an interpretation-sensitive theory of legal gaps, as opposed to purely normativist ones. Chapter 8 explores the connection between judicial reasoning and judicial fictions, casting light on the structure and purpose of fictional reasoning. Chapter 9 provides an analytical enquiry into judicial precedent, examining a variety of ideal-typical systems in terms of their normative or de iure relevance. Chapter 10 addresses defeasibility and legal indeterminacy. In closing, Chapter 11 highlights the central tenets of a realistic theory of legislation.--$$cProvided by publisher.
000891496 650_0 $$aJurisprudence.
000891496 650_0 $$aLaw$$xPhilosophy.
000891496 77608 $$iPrint version: $$z3030155889$$z9783030155889$$w(OCoLC)1085964814
000891496 830_0 $$aLaw and philosophy library ;$$vv. 128.
000891496 852__ $$bebk
000891496 85640 $$3SpringerLink$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-030-15590-2$$zOnline Access$$91397441.1
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