Intro; Preface; Contents; About the Author; List of Figures; 1 Introduction; 1.1 Epistemological Naturalism; 1.1.1 Its Central Claim: Justificatory Monism; 1.1.2 Its Practice: Naturalized Epistemology as Empirical Psychology; 1.1.3 Some Structural Aspects; 1.2 The Content and General Argument of the Book; References; 2 Quine I: The Bold Physicalism of Word and Object; 2.1 The Theoretical Background of Quine's Naturalized Epistemology; 2.1.1 Eschatological Physicalism; 2.1.2 A Physicalistic Ban on Final Causes; 2.1.3 Behaviorism: The Physicalist's Psychology

2.1.4 Source- and Checkpoint-Empiricism2.2 The Elegantly Physicalistic, But Flawed Account of Word and Object; 2.2.1 The Account of Word and Object; 2.2.2 The Flaw: Stimulus Meanings Are Private; References; 3 Quine II: The Evolutionary-Perceptual Account; 3.1 Quine's Struggle to Explain Intersubjectivity; 3.1.1 Natural Kinds: A Transitory Period; 3.1.2 The Advent of Innate Perceptual Similarity Standards; 3.1.3 An Emphatic Interlude; 3.1.4 Finally: A Preestablished Harmony of Similarity Standards; 3.2 Summary: Quine's Naturalized Epistemology

3.3 Two Internal Problems for Quine's Eschatological Physicalism3.3.1 Quine's Invocations of Natural Selection Are Probably Unscientific; 3.3.2 Quine's Infant Needs to Understand Final Causation; References; 4 Burge: Proto-Predicates in Perceptual Representations; 4.1 Contemporary Perceptual Psychology; 4.2 Burge's Case for Objective Representation in Perception; 4.3 Why Even Quine Should Take Perceptual Psychology Seriously; 4.4 Conclusion: A Step Forward, but Only a Step; References; 5 Maddy: Conceiving Logic as an Innate Cognitive Mechanism

5.1 Spelkean Nativism and Maddy's Pre-linguistic Rudimentary Logic5.2 In Support of Nativism: Preferential Looking Experiments; 5.3 Preferential Looking Experiments Do Not Vindicate Nativism; 5.3.1 Nativism Needs Very Specific Evidence; 5.3.2 The Experiments Do Not Provide Sufficiently Specific Evidence; 5.3.3 Conclusion: Insufficient Evidence for Innate Logic; 5.4 Conclusion: Dim Prospects for Naturalized Epistemology; References; 6 Quine's Empiricist Justificatory Monism; 6.1 Quine's Case for His Empiricist Justificatory Monism; 6.1.1 Quine's Reading of Carnap's Position on Justification

6.1.2 Quine's Verification Holism Underpins His Justificatory Monism6.1.3 Quine's Holophrastic Empiricism Justifies His Verification Holism; 6.1.4 An Alternative Reading of Quine's Verification Holism; 6.2 A Critique of Quine's Empiricist Justificatory Monism; 6.2.1 Empirical Evidence Is Probably Not Holophrastic; 6.2.2 Quine's Explication of Justification Is Not Justifiable in the Sense It Explicates; 6.3 Quine's Conception of Science Is Not Epistemically Self-Sufficient; References; 7 Why Justificatory Monism Needs Scientific Realism