Human rights, ownership, and the individual / Rowan Cruft.
2019
JC571
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Details
Title
Human rights, ownership, and the individual / Rowan Cruft.
Author
Edition
First edition.
ISBN
9780191884122 (electronic book)
Published
Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2019.
Language
English
Description
1 online resource.
Call Number
JC571
Dewey Decimal Classification
323
Summary
Is it defensible to use the concept of a right? Can we justify this concept's central place in modern moral and legal thinking, or does it unjustifiably side-line those who do not qualify as right-holders? Rowan Cruft brings together a new account of the concept of a right. Moving beyond the traditional 'interest theory' and 'will theory', he defends a distinctive role for the concept: it is appropriate to our thinking about fundamental moral duties springing from the good of the right-holder. This has important implications for the idea of 'natural' moral rights - that is, rights that exist independently of anyone's recognising that they do. Cruft argues that only rights that exist primarily for the sake of the right-holder can qualify as natural in this sense.
Note
Is it defensible to use the concept of a right? Can we justify this concept's central place in modern moral and legal thinking, or does it unjustifiably side-line those who do not qualify as right-holders? Rowan Cruft brings together a new account of the concept of a right. Moving beyond the traditional 'interest theory' and 'will theory', he defends a distinctive role for the concept: it is appropriate to our thinking about fundamental moral duties springing from the good of the right-holder. This has important implications for the idea of 'natural' moral rights - that is, rights that exist independently of anyone's recognising that they do. Cruft argues that only rights that exist primarily for the sake of the right-holder can qualify as natural in this sense.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Access Note
Access limited to authorized users.
Source of Description
Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on September 18, 2019).
Series
Oxford scholarship online.
Available in Other Form
Print version: 9780198793366
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