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Intro; Editorial; Contents; Part I Mach and Austrian Philosophy; 1 Only a Philosophical "Holiday Sportsman"?
Ernst Mach as a Scientist Transgressing the Disciplinary Boundaries; 1.1 Mach and His Times
An Extraordinary Intellectual Journey; 1.2 Mach and Philosophy; References; References; 2 The Specter of "Austrian Philosophy": Ernst Mach and a Modern Tradition of Post-Philosophy; 2.1 Kant's Begriffe: The Act of Grasping as Localized, Embodied Knowledge Production; 2.2 Defining Disciplines Within an "Austrian" Tradition: Kantianism as Pedagogy
2.3 Some Conclusions: Remapping Philosophical Disciplines3 Brentano's Lectures on Positivism (1893-1894) and His Relationship to Ernst Mach; 3.1 Brentano's Background and the Sources of His Interests in Positivism; 3.2 Brentano's Lectures "Contemporary Philosophical Questions": An Overview; 3.3 Mach's Psychophysical Identity and His Theory of Elements; 3.4 The Argument of Brentano Against the Identity Thesis: Intentionality; 3.5 Identity Versus Correlation; 3.6 Final Remarks; References; 4 From Brentano to Mach. Carving Austrian Philosophy at its Joints
4.1 The Received View. Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung4.2 Mach as Brentano's Successor; 4.3 Descriptive Psychology and the Natural Sciences; 4.4 The Objectivist-Phenomenological Paradigm; References; Archival Materials; 5 Mach, Wittgenstein, Science and Logic; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 The Received View of the Mach-Wittgenstein Relationship; 5.3 Affinities, and More Specific Claims
the Heterodoxy; 5.4 Visser's General Picture of Wittgenstein as a `Non-Kantian Philosopher'; 5.5 Mach's Status, and the Nature of Visser's Claims; 5.6 The Motivation for Rejecting any Claim of Mach's Influence
5.7 Philosophy of Physics
Visser's Central Claim5.8 Incongruous Counterparts; 5.9 Time, Difference, and Changes; 5.10 Physical Principles; 5.11 Logical Necessity; 5.12 Mach's Traditional Conception of Logic, and his Psychologism; 5.13 Science as Descriptive; 5.14 The Laws of Nature
Mach; 5.15 The Laws of Nature
Wittgenstein; 5.16 Wittgenstein's Use of `Mach's Method'?; 5.17 Hertz's Method, and Mach's; 5.18 Conclusion; References
6 Mach's "Sensation", Gomperz's "Feeling", and the Positivist Debate About the Nature of the Elementary Constituents of Experience. A Comparative Study in an Epistemological and Psychological Context6.1 Introduction; 6.2 The German-Speaking Paradigm of Immanenzpositivismus: A Brief Reassessment; 6.2.1 Some Terminological and Conceptual Clarifications; 6.2.2 The Issue of Experience in Immanenzpositivismus; 6.3 Mach's Sensation-Based Epistemology; 6.3.1 Mach's Concept of "Element"; 6.3.2 The Psychological Definition of Sensation; 6.3.3 The Place of Feelings in Mach's Epistemology; 6.4 Gomperz's Feeling-Based Epistemology
Ernst Mach as a Scientist Transgressing the Disciplinary Boundaries; 1.1 Mach and His Times
An Extraordinary Intellectual Journey; 1.2 Mach and Philosophy; References; References; 2 The Specter of "Austrian Philosophy": Ernst Mach and a Modern Tradition of Post-Philosophy; 2.1 Kant's Begriffe: The Act of Grasping as Localized, Embodied Knowledge Production; 2.2 Defining Disciplines Within an "Austrian" Tradition: Kantianism as Pedagogy
2.3 Some Conclusions: Remapping Philosophical Disciplines3 Brentano's Lectures on Positivism (1893-1894) and His Relationship to Ernst Mach; 3.1 Brentano's Background and the Sources of His Interests in Positivism; 3.2 Brentano's Lectures "Contemporary Philosophical Questions": An Overview; 3.3 Mach's Psychophysical Identity and His Theory of Elements; 3.4 The Argument of Brentano Against the Identity Thesis: Intentionality; 3.5 Identity Versus Correlation; 3.6 Final Remarks; References; 4 From Brentano to Mach. Carving Austrian Philosophy at its Joints
4.1 The Received View. Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung4.2 Mach as Brentano's Successor; 4.3 Descriptive Psychology and the Natural Sciences; 4.4 The Objectivist-Phenomenological Paradigm; References; Archival Materials; 5 Mach, Wittgenstein, Science and Logic; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 The Received View of the Mach-Wittgenstein Relationship; 5.3 Affinities, and More Specific Claims
the Heterodoxy; 5.4 Visser's General Picture of Wittgenstein as a `Non-Kantian Philosopher'; 5.5 Mach's Status, and the Nature of Visser's Claims; 5.6 The Motivation for Rejecting any Claim of Mach's Influence
5.7 Philosophy of Physics
Visser's Central Claim5.8 Incongruous Counterparts; 5.9 Time, Difference, and Changes; 5.10 Physical Principles; 5.11 Logical Necessity; 5.12 Mach's Traditional Conception of Logic, and his Psychologism; 5.13 Science as Descriptive; 5.14 The Laws of Nature
Mach; 5.15 The Laws of Nature
Wittgenstein; 5.16 Wittgenstein's Use of `Mach's Method'?; 5.17 Hertz's Method, and Mach's; 5.18 Conclusion; References
6 Mach's "Sensation", Gomperz's "Feeling", and the Positivist Debate About the Nature of the Elementary Constituents of Experience. A Comparative Study in an Epistemological and Psychological Context6.1 Introduction; 6.2 The German-Speaking Paradigm of Immanenzpositivismus: A Brief Reassessment; 6.2.1 Some Terminological and Conceptual Clarifications; 6.2.2 The Issue of Experience in Immanenzpositivismus; 6.3 Mach's Sensation-Based Epistemology; 6.3.1 Mach's Concept of "Element"; 6.3.2 The Psychological Definition of Sensation; 6.3.3 The Place of Feelings in Mach's Epistemology; 6.4 Gomperz's Feeling-Based Epistemology