Nuclear weapons and deterrence stability in South Asia / Devin T. Hagerty.
Hagerty, Devin T., author.
2020
UA832.7 .H344 2020
Available Online

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Title Nuclear weapons and deterrence stability in South Asia / Devin T. Hagerty.
Author Hagerty, Devin T., author.
ISBN 3030213986 (electronic book)
9783030213985 (electronic book)
9783030213978
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21398-5
Published Cham, Switzerland : Palgrave Macmillan, [2020]
Language English
Description 1 online resource (xviii, 134 pages).
Item Number 10.1007/978-3-030-21398-5 doi
Call Number UA832.7 .H344 2020
Dewey Decimal Classification 355
Summary "This is a carefully argued, empirically sound and theoretically deft analysis of deterrence stability and its limits in South Asia. It provides appropriate details about the diplomatic and strategic postures of both India and Pakistan, and it discusses possible pathways for enhancing deterrence stability in the region." -Sumit Ganguly, Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations, Indiana University, Bloomington, USA "In this compact volume, Devin Hagerty provides a multi-layered account that is both theoretically informed and empirically grounded. It will be essential reading for students, scholars, and practitioners interested in understanding the South Asian security environment and deterrence more generally." -S. Paul Kapur, Professor, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, USA This book examines the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan, two highly antagonistic South Asian neighbors who recently moved into their third decade of overt nuclear weaponization. It assesses the stability of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence and argues that, while deterrence dampens the likelihood of escalation to conventional-and possibly nuclear-war, the chronically embittered relations between New Delhi and Islamabad mean that deterrence failure resulting in major warfare cannot be ruled out. Through an empirical examination of the effects of nuclear weapons during five crises between India and Pakistan since 1998, as well as a discussion of the theoretical logic of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence, the book offers suggestions for enhancing deterrence stability between these two countries. Devin T. Hagerty is Professor of Political Science at the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, USA.
Bibliography, etc. Note Includes bibliographical references and index.
Access Note Access limited to authorized users.
Source of Description Description based on print version record
Series Palgrave pivot.
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Record Appears in Online Resources > Ebooks
All Resources
1 Introduction
2 India-Pakistan Crises, 1999-2016
3 Explaining Indian Moderation During Crises, 1999-2016
4 Deterrence Stability in South Asia Today
5 Enhancing India-Pakistan Deterrence Stability.

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