TY  - GEN
N2  - Lisa Bortolotti argues that some irrational beliefs are epistemically innocent and deliver significant epistemic benefits that could not be easily attained otherwise. While the benefits of the irrational belief may not outweigh the costs, epistemic innocence helps to clarify the epistemic and psychological effects of irrational beliefs on agency.
AB  - Lisa Bortolotti argues that some irrational beliefs are epistemically innocent and deliver significant epistemic benefits that could not be easily attained otherwise. While the benefits of the irrational belief may not outweigh the costs, epistemic innocence helps to clarify the epistemic and psychological effects of irrational beliefs on agency.
T1  - The epistemic innocence of irrational beliefs /
AU  - Bortolotti, Lisa,
ET  - First edition.
CN  - Oxford Scholarship Online
CN  - B824.2
ID  - 938002
KW  - Irrationalism (Philosophy)
KW  - Virtue epistemology.
SN  - 9780191896262 
TI  - The epistemic innocence of irrational beliefs /
LK  - https://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198863984.001.0001
UR  - https://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198863984.001.0001
ER  -