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000938002 001__ 938002
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000938002 008__ 200622s2020\\\\enk\\\\\ob\\\\001\0\eng\d
000938002 020__ $$a9780191896262 $$q(electronic book)
000938002 035__ $$a(StDuBDS)EDZ0002305410
000938002 040__ $$aStDuBDS$$beng$$cStDuBDS$$erda$$epn
000938002 050_4 $$aB824.2
000938002 08204 $$a128.33$$223
000938002 1001_ $$aBortolotti, Lisa,$$eauthor.
000938002 24514 $$aThe epistemic innocence of irrational beliefs /$$cLisa Bortolotti.
000938002 250__ $$aFirst edition.
000938002 264_1 $$aOxford :$$bOxford University Press,$$c2020.
000938002 300__ $$a1 online resource.
000938002 336__ $$atext$$2rdacontent
000938002 337__ $$acomputer$$2rdamedia
000938002 338__ $$aonline resource$$2rdacarrier
000938002 4901_ $$aOxford scholarship online
000938002 504__ $$aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
000938002 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
000938002 5208_ $$aLisa Bortolotti argues that some irrational beliefs are epistemically innocent and deliver significant epistemic benefits that could not be easily attained otherwise. While the benefits of the irrational belief may not outweigh the costs, epistemic innocence helps to clarify the epistemic and psychological effects of irrational beliefs on agency.
000938002 588__ $$aDescription based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on July 23, 2020).
000938002 650_0 $$aIrrationalism (Philosophy)
000938002 650_0 $$aVirtue epistemology.
000938002 77608 $$iPrint version:$$z9780198863984
000938002 830_0 $$aOxford scholarship online.
000938002 85280 $$bebk$$hOxford Scholarship Online
000938002 85640 $$3Oxford scholarship online$$uhttps://univsouthin.idm.oclc.org/login?url=https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198863984.001.0001$$zOnline Access
000938002 909CO $$ooai:library.usi.edu:938002$$pGLOBAL_SET
000938002 980__ $$aEBOOK
000938002 980__ $$aBIB
000938002 982__ $$aEbook
000938002 983__ $$aOnline