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000939915 019__ $$a1038484870$$a1097148772
000939915 020__ $$a9783319772882$$q(electronic book)
000939915 020__ $$a3319772880$$q(electronic book)
000939915 020__ $$z9783319772875
000939915 020__ $$z3319772872
000939915 0247_ $$a10.1007/978-3-319-77288-2$$2doi
000939915 035__ $$aSP(OCoLC)on1038716493
000939915 035__ $$aSP(OCoLC)1038716493$$z(OCoLC)1038484870$$z(OCoLC)1097148772
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000939915 049__ $$aISEA
000939915 050_4 $$aBJ1012
000939915 08204 $$a170$$223
000939915 1001_ $$aKalf, Wouter Floris,$$eauthor.
000939915 24510 $$aMoral error theory /$$cWouter Floris Kalf.
000939915 264_1 $$aCham, Switzerland :$$bPalgrave Macmillan,$$c[2018]
000939915 300__ $$a1 online resource
000939915 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
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000939915 504__ $$aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
000939915 506__ $$aAccess limited to authorized users.
000939915 520__ $$aThis book provides a novel formulation and defence of moral error theory. It also provides a novel solution to the so-called now what question; viz., the question what we should do with our moral thought and talk after moral error theory. The novel formulation of moral error theory uses pragmatic presupposition rather than conceptual entailment to argue that moral judgments carry a non-negotiable commitment to categorical moral reasons. The new answer to the now what question is pragmatic presupposition substitutionism: we should substitute our current moral judgments, which pragmatically presuppose the existence of categorical moral reasons with 'schmoral' judgments that pragmatically presuppose the existence of a specific class of prudential reasons. These are prudential reasons that, when we act on them, contribute to the satisfaction of what the author calls 'the fundamental desire'; namely, the desire to live in a world with mutually beneficial cooperation.
000939915 588__ $$aOnline resource; title from PDF title page (viewed June 7, 2018).
000939915 650_0 $$aJudgment (Ethics)
000939915 650_0 $$aMetaethics.
000939915 77608 $$iPrint version:$$aKalf, Wouter Floris.$$tMoral error theory.$$dCham, Switzerland : Palgrave Macmillan, [2018]$$z9783319772875$$z3319772872$$w(OCoLC)1030030099
000939915 852__ $$bebk
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