The mind doesn't work that way : the scope and limits of computational psychology / Jerry Fodor.
2001
BD418.3 .F627 2001eb
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Details
Title
The mind doesn't work that way : the scope and limits of computational psychology / Jerry Fodor.
Author
Fodor, Jerry A.
ISBN
9780262272902 (electronic bk.)
0262272903 (electronic bk.)
0262062127 (hc ; alk. paper)
9780262062121 (hc ; alk. paper)
0262561468
9780262561464
0262272903 (electronic bk.)
0262062127 (hc ; alk. paper)
9780262062121 (hc ; alk. paper)
0262561468
9780262561464
Publication Details
Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2001.
Language
English
Description
1 online resource (126 pages).
Call Number
BD418.3 .F627 2001eb
Dewey Decimal Classification
153 F683m3
Summary
Annotation In this engaging book, Jerry Fodor argues against the widely held view that mental processes are largely computations, that the architecture of cognition is massively modular, and that the explanation of our innate mental structure is basically Darwinian. Although Fodor has praised the computational theory of mind as the best theory of cognition that we have got, he considers it to be only a fragment of the truth. In fact, he claims, cognitive scientists do not really know much yet about how the mind works (the book's title refers to Steve Pinker's How the Mind Works). Fodor's primary aim is to explore the relationship among computational and modular theories of mind, nativism, and evolutionary psychology. Along the way, he explains how Chomsky's version of nativism differs from that of the widely received New Synthesis approach. He concludes that although we have no grounds to suppose that most of the mind is modular, we have no idea how nonmodular cognition could work. Thus, according to Fodor, cognitive science has hardly gotten started.
Note
Annotation In this engaging book, Jerry Fodor argues against the widely held view that mental processes are largely computations, that the architecture of cognition is massively modular, and that the explanation of our innate mental structure is basically Darwinian. Although Fodor has praised the computational theory of mind as the best theory of cognition that we have got, he considers it to be only a fragment of the truth. In fact, he claims, cognitive scientists do not really know much yet about how the mind works (the book's title refers to Steve Pinker's How the Mind Works). Fodor's primary aim is to explore the relationship among computational and modular theories of mind, nativism, and evolutionary psychology. Along the way, he explains how Chomsky's version of nativism differs from that of the widely received New Synthesis approach. He concludes that although we have no grounds to suppose that most of the mind is modular, we have no idea how nonmodular cognition could work. Thus, according to Fodor, cognitive science has hardly gotten started.
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M.I.T. Press.
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