Breach of contract : an economic analysis of the efficient breach scenario / Oliver Hofmann.
Hofmann, Oliver, author.
2021
K877 .H64 2021
Available Online

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Title Breach of contract : an economic analysis of the efficient breach scenario / Oliver Hofmann.
Author Hofmann, Oliver, author.
ISBN 9783030625252 (electronic bk.)
3030625257 (electronic bk.)
3030625249 (hardcover)
9783030625245 (hardcover)
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-62525-2
Published Cham, Switzerland : Springer, [2021]
Language English
Description 1 online resource
Other Standard Identifiers 10.1007/978-3-030-62525-2 doi
Call Number K877 .H64 2021
Dewey Decimal Classification 346.022
Summary "Efficient breach" is one of the most discussed topics in the literature of law and economics. What remedy incentivizes the parties of a contract to perform contracts if and only if it is efficient? This book provides a new perception based on an in-depth analysis of the impact the market structure, asymmetry of information, and deviations from the rational choice model have, comprehensively. The author compares the two predominant remedies for breach of contract which have been adopted by most jurisdictions and also found access to international conventions like the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CiSG): Specific performance and expectation damages. The book illustrates the complexity such a comparison has under more realistic assumptions. The author shows that no simple answer is possible, but one needs to account for the circumstances. The comparison takes an economic approach to law applying game theory. The game-theoretic models are consistent throughout the entire book which makes it easy for the reader to understand what effects different assumptions about the market structure, the distribution of information, and deviations from the rational choice model have, and how they are intertwined
Note Title from digital title page (viewed on March 11, 2021).
Bibliography, etc. Note Includes bibliographical references.
Access Note Access limited to authorized users.
Digital File Characteristics text file
PDF
Series International law and economics (Springer (Firm))
Available in Other Form Breach of contract.
Linked Resources Online Access
Record Appears in Online Resources > Ebooks
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Introduction
Breach or perform decision: The traditional model of the efficient breach
Distributional effects and the original contract
The option to cover
Over- and undercompensation
Incomplete information
Transaction costs
Conclusion.

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