Revisiting Searle on deriving "ought" from "is" / Paolo Di Lucia, Edoardo Fittipaldi, editors.
Di Lucia, Paolo, editor.; Fittipaldi, Edoardo, editor.
2021
B1649.S264 R48 2021
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Title Revisiting Searle on deriving "ought" from "is" / Paolo Di Lucia, Edoardo Fittipaldi, editors.
ISBN 9783030541163 (electronic bk.)
3030541169 (electronic bk.)
9783030541156
3030541150
DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54116-3
Published Cham, Switzerland : Palgrave Macmillan, [2021]
Language English
Description 1 online resource
Item Number 10.1007/978-3-030-54116-3 doi
Call Number B1649.S264 R48 2021
Dewey Decimal Classification 191
123
Summary This book reconsiders the supposed impossibility of deriving "Ought" from "Is". John R. Searle's 1964 article How to Derive "Ought" from "Is"' sent shockwaves through the philosophical community by offering a straightforward counterexample to this claim of impossibility: from your promising something- and this is an "is"--It simply follows that you 'ought' to do it. This volume opens with a brand new chapter from Searle who, in light of his subsequent philosophical developments, expounds the reasons for the validity of that derivation and its crucial significance for social ontology and moral philosophy. Then, in a fresh interview with the editors of this volume, Searle explores a range of topics including how his derivation relates to constitutive rules, and how he views Wittgenstein's philosophy, deontic logic, and the rationality of action. The remainder of the volume is dedicated to a deep dive into Searle's essay and its implications by international scholars with diverse backgrounds ranging from analytic philosophy, phenomenology, and logic, to moral philosophy and the philosophy and sociology of law. With thirteen original chapters, the contributors provide fresh and timely insights on hotly debated issues: the nature of "Ought"; the logical structure of the social world; and the possibility of deriving not only "Ought" from "Is", but "Is" from "Ought."
Bibliography, etc. Note Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
Access Note Access limited to authorized users.
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Source of Description Online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on March 24, 2021).
Added Author Di Lucia, Paolo, editor.
Fittipaldi, Edoardo, editor.
Available in Other Form Revisiting Searle on deriving "ought" from "is".
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Chapter 1. How to Derive "Ought" from "Is" Revisited. John R. Searle
Chapter 2. An Interview with John R. Searle. Paolo Di Lucia & Edoardo Fittipaldi
Part 2
Chapter 3. Is and Ought: Where Does the Problem Lie?. Pedro M.S. Alves
Chapter 4. Searlean "Is" and "Ought" Revisited. Wojciech Zeaniec
Chapter 5. Some Remarks on Searle's View on the Logic of Practical Reasoning. Marco Santambrogio
Chapter 6. On the Regulative Functions of Constitutive Rules. Frederick Schauer
Chapter 7. Existence as the Source of Normativity: An Alternative to Searle's Way. Roberto De Monticelli
Chapter 8. How to Derive Is from Ought. Amedo Giovanni Conte
Chapter 9. Searle vs. Conte on Constitutive Rules. Corrado Roversi
Chapter 10. "Ought" is Spoken in Many Ways. Paolo Di Lucia
Chapter 11. Constitutive Rules, Criteria of Validity, and Law. Matthew Grellette
Chapter 12. Can Constitutive Rules Bridge the Gap Between Is and Ought Statements?. Frank A. Hindriks
Chapter 13. Searle and Conte on Deriving Ought from Is. Jan Wolenski
Chapter 14. Why Moral Norms Cannot Be Reduced to Facts: On a Trilemma in Derivations of Moral "Ought" from "Is". Wojciech Zauski
Chapter 15. On Searle's Derivation and its Relation to Constitutive Rules: A Social Scientist's Perspective. Edoardo Fittipaldi.

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