Auctions and Mechanism Design
Improved Two Sample Revenue Guarantees via Mixed-Integer Linear Programming
The Price of Stability of Envy-Free Equilibria in Multi-Buyer Sequential Auctions
Auctions with Interdependence and SOS: Improved Approximation
Approximate Mechanism Design for Distributed Facility Location
Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values
Incentive Compatible Mechanism for Influential Agent Selection
Computational Aspects of Games
On Tightness of the Tsaknakis-Spirakis Algorithm for Approximate Nash Equilibrium
Prophet Inequality with Competing Agents
Lower Bounds for the Query Complexity of Equilibria in Lipschitz Games- Gerrymandering on graphs: Computational complexity and parameterized algorithms
Game theory on the blockchain: a model for games with smart contracts
Algorithmic Challenges in Information Design XVII
On the Complexity of Nucleolus Computation for Bipartite b-Matching Games
Pure Nash Equilibria in a Generalization of Congestion Games Allowing Resource Failures
Markets and Matchings
On (Coalitional) Exchange-Stable Matching
Optimal Revenue Guarantees for Pricing in Large Markets
Approximate Competitive Equilibrium with Generic Budget
Cost Sharing in Two-Sided Markets
The Three-Dimensional Stable Roommates Problem with Additively Separable Preferences
Descending the Stable Matching Lattice: How many Strategic Agents are required to turn Pessimality to Optimality?
Social Choice and Cooperative Games
Metric-Distortion Bounds under Limited Information
Hedonic Expertise Games
When Dividing Mixed Manna is Easier than Dividing Goods: Competitive Equilibria with a Constant Number of Chores
Computing Fair and Efficient Allocations with Few Utility Values
An Approval-Based Model for Single-Step Liquid Democracy
Two Birds With One Stone: Fairness and Welfare via Transfers
Pirates in Wonderland: Liquid Democracy has Bicriteria Guarantees
Abstracts
On Reward Sharing in Blockchain Mining Pools
On Submodular Prophet Inequalities and Correlation Gap
Vote Delegation and Misbehavio.