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Table of Contents
1. A cooperative species
2. The evolution of altruism in humans. Preferences, beliefs, and constraints ; Social preferences and social dilemmas ; Genes, culture, groups, and institutions
3. Social preferences. Strong reciprocity is common ; Free-riders undermine cooperation ; Altruistic punishment sustains cooperation ; Effective punishment depends on legitimacy ; Purely symbolic punishment is effective ; People punish those who hurt others ; Social preferences are not irrational ; Culture and institutions matter ; Behavior is conditioned on group membership ; People enjoy cooperating and punishing free-riders ; Social preferences in laboratory and natural settings ; Competing explanations
4. The sociobiology of human cooperation. Inclusive fitness and human cooperation ; Modeling multi-level selection ; Equilibrium selection ; Reciprocal altruism ; Reciprocal altruism in large groups ; Reputation : indirect reciprocity ; Altruism as a signal of quality ; Positive assortment ; Mechanisms and motives
5. Cooperative Homo economicus. Folk theorems and evolutionary dynamics ; The folk theorem with imperfect public information ; The folk theorem with private information ; Evolutionarily irrelevant equilibria ; Social norms and correlated equilibria ; The missing choreographer
6. Ancestral human society. Cosmopolitan ancestors ; Genetic evidence ; Prehistoric warfare ; The foundations of social order ; The crucible of cooperation
7. The coevolution of institutions and behaviors. Selective extinction ; Reproductive leveling ; Genetic differentiation between groups ; Deme extinction and the evolution of altruism ; The Australian laboratory ; The coevolution of institutions and altruism ; Simulating gene-culture coevolution ; Levelers and warriors
8. Parochialism, altruism, and war. Parochial altruism and war ; The emergence of parochial altruism and war ; Simulated and experimental parochial altruism ; The legacy of a past "red in tooth and claw"
9. The evolution of strong reciprocity. Coordinated punishment ; Altruistic punishment in a realistic demography ; The emergence of strong reciprocity ; Why coordinated punishment succeeds ; A decentralized social order
10. Socialization. Cultural transmission ; Socialization and the survival of fitness-reducing norms ; Genes, culture, and the internalization of norms ; The internalized norm as hitchhiker ; The gene-culture coevolution of a fitness-reducing norm ; How can internalized norms be altruistic? ; The programmable brain
11. Social emotions. Reciprocity, shame, and punishment ; The evolution of social emotions ; The "great captains of our lives"
12. Human cooperation and its evolution. The origins of human cooperation ; The future of cooperation
Appendixes. A1. Altruism defined ; A2. Agent-based models ; A3. Game theory ; A4. Dynamical systems ; A5. The replicator dynamic ; A6. Continuation probability and time discount factor ; A7. Alternatives to the standing model ; A8. The prisoner's dilemma with public and private signals ; A9. Student and nonstudent experimental subjects ; A10. The price equation ; A11. Weak multi-level selection ; A12. Cooperation and punishment with quorum sensing.
2. The evolution of altruism in humans. Preferences, beliefs, and constraints ; Social preferences and social dilemmas ; Genes, culture, groups, and institutions
3. Social preferences. Strong reciprocity is common ; Free-riders undermine cooperation ; Altruistic punishment sustains cooperation ; Effective punishment depends on legitimacy ; Purely symbolic punishment is effective ; People punish those who hurt others ; Social preferences are not irrational ; Culture and institutions matter ; Behavior is conditioned on group membership ; People enjoy cooperating and punishing free-riders ; Social preferences in laboratory and natural settings ; Competing explanations
4. The sociobiology of human cooperation. Inclusive fitness and human cooperation ; Modeling multi-level selection ; Equilibrium selection ; Reciprocal altruism ; Reciprocal altruism in large groups ; Reputation : indirect reciprocity ; Altruism as a signal of quality ; Positive assortment ; Mechanisms and motives
5. Cooperative Homo economicus. Folk theorems and evolutionary dynamics ; The folk theorem with imperfect public information ; The folk theorem with private information ; Evolutionarily irrelevant equilibria ; Social norms and correlated equilibria ; The missing choreographer
6. Ancestral human society. Cosmopolitan ancestors ; Genetic evidence ; Prehistoric warfare ; The foundations of social order ; The crucible of cooperation
7. The coevolution of institutions and behaviors. Selective extinction ; Reproductive leveling ; Genetic differentiation between groups ; Deme extinction and the evolution of altruism ; The Australian laboratory ; The coevolution of institutions and altruism ; Simulating gene-culture coevolution ; Levelers and warriors
8. Parochialism, altruism, and war. Parochial altruism and war ; The emergence of parochial altruism and war ; Simulated and experimental parochial altruism ; The legacy of a past "red in tooth and claw"
9. The evolution of strong reciprocity. Coordinated punishment ; Altruistic punishment in a realistic demography ; The emergence of strong reciprocity ; Why coordinated punishment succeeds ; A decentralized social order
10. Socialization. Cultural transmission ; Socialization and the survival of fitness-reducing norms ; Genes, culture, and the internalization of norms ; The internalized norm as hitchhiker ; The gene-culture coevolution of a fitness-reducing norm ; How can internalized norms be altruistic? ; The programmable brain
11. Social emotions. Reciprocity, shame, and punishment ; The evolution of social emotions ; The "great captains of our lives"
12. Human cooperation and its evolution. The origins of human cooperation ; The future of cooperation
Appendixes. A1. Altruism defined ; A2. Agent-based models ; A3. Game theory ; A4. Dynamical systems ; A5. The replicator dynamic ; A6. Continuation probability and time discount factor ; A7. Alternatives to the standing model ; A8. The prisoner's dilemma with public and private signals ; A9. Student and nonstudent experimental subjects ; A10. The price equation ; A11. Weak multi-level selection ; A12. Cooperation and punishment with quorum sensing.