Modest nonconceptualism [electronic resource] : epistemology, phenomenology, and content / Eva Schmidt.
2015
BD161.A67
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Title
Modest nonconceptualism [electronic resource] : epistemology, phenomenology, and content / Eva Schmidt.
Author
Schmidt, Eva, author.
ISBN
9783319189024 electronic book
3319189026 electronic book
9783319189017
3319189026 electronic book
9783319189017
Published
Cham : Springer, [2015]
Copyright
©2015
Language
English
Description
1 online resource.
Call Number
BD161.A67
Dewey Decimal Classification
121
Summary
The author defends nonconceptualism, the claim that perceptual experience is nonconceptual and has nonconceptual content. Continuing the heated and complex debate surrounding this topic over the past two decades, she offers a sustained defense of a novel version of the view, Modest Nonconceptualism, and provides a systematic overview of some of the central controversies in the debate. The volume starts off with an explication of the notion of nonconceptual content and a distinction between nonconceptualist views of different strengths, then the author goes on to defend participants in the debate over nonconceptual content against the allegation that their failure to distinguish between a state view and a content view of (non)conceptualism leads to fatal problems for their views. Next, she makes a case for nonconceptualism by refining some of the central arguments for the view, such as the arguments from fineness of grain, from contradictory contents, from animal and infant perception, and from concept acquisition. Then, two central objections against nonconceptualism are rebutted in a novel way: the epistemological objection and the objection from objectivity. Modest Nonconceptualism allows for perceptual experiences to involve some conceptual elements. It emphasizes the relevance of concept employment for an understanding of conceptual and nonconceptual mental states and identifies the nonconceptual content of experience with scenario content. It insists on the possibility of genuine content-bearing perceptual experience without concept possession and is thus in line with the Autonomy Thesis. Finally, it includes an account of perceptual justification that relies on the external contents of experience and belief, yet is compatible with epistemological internalism.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references.
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Source of Description
Online resource; title from PDF title page (viewed July 15, 2015).
Series
Studies in brain and mind ; 8.
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Table of Contents
1 Introduction
2 Content, Concepts, Concept Possession
3 Nonconceptual Content
4 Arguments from Phenomenology
5 The Argument from Contradictory Contents
6 Arguments from Concept Possession
7 The Epistemological Objection
8 The Objection from Objectivity
9 Modest Nonconceptualism Vindicated.
2 Content, Concepts, Concept Possession
3 Nonconceptual Content
4 Arguments from Phenomenology
5 The Argument from Contradictory Contents
6 Arguments from Concept Possession
7 The Epistemological Objection
8 The Objection from Objectivity
9 Modest Nonconceptualism Vindicated.