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Preface; Acknowledgements; Contents; List of Contributors; 1 Dynamic Games with Perfect Information; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Differential Games of Pursuit; 1.3 Cooperative Multistage Games with Perfect Information; 1.4 Cooperative Differential Games; 1.4.1 Definition of Cooperative Differential Games in Characteristic Function Form; 1.4.2 The Principle of Time-Consistency (Dynamic Stability); 1.4.3 Time-Consistent Solutions; 1.4.4 Strongly Time-Consistent Solutions; 1.4.5 Terminal Payoffs; References; 2 Dynamic Admission Game into an M/M/1 Queue; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 The Model
2.2.1 The General Threshold Framework2.3 Steady State Probabilities for Threshold Policies; 2.4 The Partially Observed Control Problem; 2.4.1 The Structure of Optimal Policies; 2.4.2 Optimizing the Signal; 2.5 The Game Problem; 2.5.1 Structure of Equilibrium; 2.5.2 Numerical Examples; 2.5.3 Optimizing the Signal; 2.6 Concluding Remarks; Appendix: Uniform f-Geometric Ergodicity and the Continuity of the Markov Chain; References; 3 Methodological Issues in Analyzing Market Dynamics; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 The Assumptions of the Dynamic Framework
3.2.1 The Behavioral Implications of Markov Perfection3.3 Less Demanding Notions of Equilibria; 3.3.1 Computational Algorithm; 3.3.2 Empirical Challenges and Estimation; 3.3.3 Multiplicity of Equilibrium Policies; 3.4 Computational Results from an Example; 3.4.1 Conceptual Issues and Their Computational Analogues; 3.5 Conclusion; References; 4 Stochastic Games with Signals; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Zero-Sum Standard Stochastic Games; 4.2.1 The Model; 4.2.2 The Value; 4.2.3 Zero-Sum Standard Stochastic Games with Long Duration; 4.2.4 An Example: The ``Big Match''
4.3 Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Signals4.3.1 The Model; 4.3.2 Mertens' Conjectures; 4.3.3 A Counterexample to the Mertens' Conjectures; 4.3.4 Link Between the Convergence of (vn) and (vλ); 4.4 Multiplayer Stochastic Games; 4.4.1 Asymptotic Approach; 4.4.2 Uniform Approach; 4.4.3 Multiplayer Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring; 4.4.4 Stochastic Games with Signals on the State; References; 5 Nonlinear and Multiplayer Evolutionary Games; 5.1 Introduction; 5.1.1 What is Evolutionary Game Theory?; 5.1.2 Two Approaches to Game Analysis; 5.1.2.1 Dynamic Analysis; 5.1.2.2 Static Analysis
5.1.2.3 Dynamic Versus Static Analysis5.1.3 Two Classic Matrix Games; 5.1.3.1 The Hawk Dove Game; 5.1.3.2 The Prisoner's Dilemma; 5.2 Nonlinear Games; 5.2.1 Overview and General Theory; 5.2.2 Playing the Field; 5.2.3 Nonlinearity due to Non-constant Interaction Rates; 5.2.4 Nonlinearity in the Strategy of the Focal Player; 5.3 Multi-Player Games; 5.3.1 Introduction to Multi-Player Matrix Games; 5.3.2 ESSs in Multi-Player Matrix Games; 5.3.3 Two-Strategy Multi-Player Games; 5.4 Discussion; References; 6 A Zero-Sum Game Between the Network Designer and an Adversary in Consensus Protocols
2.2.1 The General Threshold Framework2.3 Steady State Probabilities for Threshold Policies; 2.4 The Partially Observed Control Problem; 2.4.1 The Structure of Optimal Policies; 2.4.2 Optimizing the Signal; 2.5 The Game Problem; 2.5.1 Structure of Equilibrium; 2.5.2 Numerical Examples; 2.5.3 Optimizing the Signal; 2.6 Concluding Remarks; Appendix: Uniform f-Geometric Ergodicity and the Continuity of the Markov Chain; References; 3 Methodological Issues in Analyzing Market Dynamics; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 The Assumptions of the Dynamic Framework
3.2.1 The Behavioral Implications of Markov Perfection3.3 Less Demanding Notions of Equilibria; 3.3.1 Computational Algorithm; 3.3.2 Empirical Challenges and Estimation; 3.3.3 Multiplicity of Equilibrium Policies; 3.4 Computational Results from an Example; 3.4.1 Conceptual Issues and Their Computational Analogues; 3.5 Conclusion; References; 4 Stochastic Games with Signals; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Zero-Sum Standard Stochastic Games; 4.2.1 The Model; 4.2.2 The Value; 4.2.3 Zero-Sum Standard Stochastic Games with Long Duration; 4.2.4 An Example: The ``Big Match''
4.3 Zero-Sum Stochastic Games with Signals4.3.1 The Model; 4.3.2 Mertens' Conjectures; 4.3.3 A Counterexample to the Mertens' Conjectures; 4.3.4 Link Between the Convergence of (vn) and (vλ); 4.4 Multiplayer Stochastic Games; 4.4.1 Asymptotic Approach; 4.4.2 Uniform Approach; 4.4.3 Multiplayer Stochastic Games with Imperfect Monitoring; 4.4.4 Stochastic Games with Signals on the State; References; 5 Nonlinear and Multiplayer Evolutionary Games; 5.1 Introduction; 5.1.1 What is Evolutionary Game Theory?; 5.1.2 Two Approaches to Game Analysis; 5.1.2.1 Dynamic Analysis; 5.1.2.2 Static Analysis
5.1.2.3 Dynamic Versus Static Analysis5.1.3 Two Classic Matrix Games; 5.1.3.1 The Hawk Dove Game; 5.1.3.2 The Prisoner's Dilemma; 5.2 Nonlinear Games; 5.2.1 Overview and General Theory; 5.2.2 Playing the Field; 5.2.3 Nonlinearity due to Non-constant Interaction Rates; 5.2.4 Nonlinearity in the Strategy of the Focal Player; 5.3 Multi-Player Games; 5.3.1 Introduction to Multi-Player Matrix Games; 5.3.2 ESSs in Multi-Player Matrix Games; 5.3.3 Two-Strategy Multi-Player Games; 5.4 Discussion; References; 6 A Zero-Sum Game Between the Network Designer and an Adversary in Consensus Protocols