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PROLOGUE: DRAMATIS PERSONAE
1. The Office of Legal Counsel
2. The Emergence of the New Realists
3. Conclusion
CHAPTER ONE: GAMING THE FEDERAL COURTS
1. The Erie Doctrine 2.0
2. The Filartiga Era: Enforcing International Law at Home
3. Filartiga's Demise, Parochialism's Rise
4. The New Realists go to Washington
5. International Law as Interpretive Guidance
6. Conclusion
CHAPTER TWO: PRESIDENTS AND LEVIATHANS
1. Public Opinion and Law
2. Presidential Power: The New Realist's Normative Argument
3. Democratic Decision-making versus Schmittology
4. Executive Action During Emergencies
5. Why Schmittian Administrative Law is Not Inevitable
6. Conclusion
CHAPTER THREE: THE ATTACK: MISUNDERSTANDING RATIONALITY
1. The Game Theory Game
2. The Prisoner's Dilemma and Nash Equilibrium
3. Law and Self-Interest
4. Objections to the Moral Obligation of States
CHAPTER FOUR: SOLVING THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
1. The Toxin Puzzle and Taking the Long View
2. The Deterrence Paradox and the Limits of Follow-Through
3. Assurances and Cooperation
4. Why the New Realists Fail to Understand Rationality
5. Rationality and Obligation
CHAPTER FIVE: WAR AS COOPERATION
1. War as Cooperation
2. Who can be Targeted? Combatants, Civilians, and CCFers
3. Geographical Constraints on Armed Conflict
4. Co-Applying the Laws of War with Human Rights
CHAPTER 6: REENGAGING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
1. Global Legalism vs. Rational Choice: A False Dichotomy
2. Does Globalization Need Taming?
3. The United Nations
4. The International Court of Justice
5. The International Criminal Court.
PROLOGUE: DRAMATIS PERSONAE
1. The Office of Legal Counsel
2. The Emergence of the New Realists
3. Conclusion
CHAPTER ONE: GAMING THE FEDERAL COURTS
1. The Erie Doctrine 2.0
2. The Filartiga Era: Enforcing International Law at Home
3. Filartiga's Demise, Parochialism's Rise
4. The New Realists go to Washington
5. International Law as Interpretive Guidance
6. Conclusion
CHAPTER TWO: PRESIDENTS AND LEVIATHANS
1. Public Opinion and Law
2. Presidential Power: The New Realist's Normative Argument
3. Democratic Decision-making versus Schmittology
4. Executive Action During Emergencies
5. Why Schmittian Administrative Law is Not Inevitable
6. Conclusion
CHAPTER THREE: THE ATTACK: MISUNDERSTANDING RATIONALITY
1. The Game Theory Game
2. The Prisoner's Dilemma and Nash Equilibrium
3. Law and Self-Interest
4. Objections to the Moral Obligation of States
CHAPTER FOUR: SOLVING THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
1. The Toxin Puzzle and Taking the Long View
2. The Deterrence Paradox and the Limits of Follow-Through
3. Assurances and Cooperation
4. Why the New Realists Fail to Understand Rationality
5. Rationality and Obligation
CHAPTER FIVE: WAR AS COOPERATION
1. War as Cooperation
2. Who can be Targeted? Combatants, Civilians, and CCFers
3. Geographical Constraints on Armed Conflict
4. Co-Applying the Laws of War with Human Rights
CHAPTER 6: REENGAGING INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
1. Global Legalism vs. Rational Choice: A False Dichotomy
2. Does Globalization Need Taming?
3. The United Nations
4. The International Court of Justice
5. The International Criminal Court.