The epistemic innocence of irrational beliefs / Lisa Bortolotti.
2020
B824.2
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Online Access
Details
Title
The epistemic innocence of irrational beliefs / Lisa Bortolotti.
Author
Bortolotti, Lisa, author.
Edition
First edition.
ISBN
9780191896262 (electronic book)
Published
Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2020.
Language
English
Description
1 online resource.
Call Number
B824.2
Dewey Decimal Classification
128.33
Summary
Lisa Bortolotti argues that some irrational beliefs are epistemically innocent and deliver significant epistemic benefits that could not be easily attained otherwise. While the benefits of the irrational belief may not outweigh the costs, epistemic innocence helps to clarify the epistemic and psychological effects of irrational beliefs on agency.
Note
Lisa Bortolotti argues that some irrational beliefs are epistemically innocent and deliver significant epistemic benefits that could not be easily attained otherwise. While the benefits of the irrational belief may not outweigh the costs, epistemic innocence helps to clarify the epistemic and psychological effects of irrational beliefs on agency.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Access Note
Access limited to authorized users.
Source of Description
Description based on online resource; title from home page (viewed on July 23, 2020).
Series
Oxford scholarship online.
Available in Other Form
Print version: 9780198863984
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Online Access
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